Various semantics for logic programs with negation are described in terms of a dualized program together with additional axioms, some of which are second order formulas. The semantics of Clark, Fitting, and Kunen are characterized in this framework, and a nite rst-order presentation of Kunen's semantics is described. A new axiom to represent common sense" reasoning is proposed for logic programs. It is shown that the well-founded semantics and stable models are de nable with this axiom. The roles of domain augmentation and domain closure are examined. A domain foundation" axiom is proposed to replace the domain closure axiom.
Introduction
Although the semantics of Horn logic programs is standard, as given in the seminal work of van Emden and Kowalski 47 , there is presently no universally accepted semantics for logic programs with negation. The rst purpose of this paper is to describe various existing proposals using a common framework of classical two-valued logic, thereby to delineate their di erences more clearly. A second purpose is to explore the e ects of various constraints on the universe or domain of interpretation on the logical consequences of the program.
Our approach is to identify the program's declarative semantics" with the logical consequences of the rules in the program, together with various additional axioms. Various sets of additional axioms give rise to various semantics. We a void the use of procedural de nitions and nonstandard logics; in some cases we use second order formulas, since they can be very useful in distinguishing concepts.
We i n troduce a new form of common-sense axiom for logic programs and show its relationship to the recently proposed semantics based on stable models and well-founded models. We shall discuss and compare the earlier semantics proposed by Clark 9 , Fitting 11 , and Kunen 19 , as well as the more recent ones identi ed with stable models 12 and well-founded models 50 .
Authors' addresses: Allen Van Gelder, Baskin Computer Science Center, 225AS, University of California, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, USA avg@cs.ucsc.edu and John S. Schlipf, Computer Science Dept., University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH 45221 USA schlipf@jschlipf.csm.uc.edu For the semantics of logic programs it is traditional to restrict attention to Herbrand models. For a de nite Horn, or negation-free logic program, one makes the same inferences by restricting attention to Herbrand models as one would by considering all models as in rst order logic. However, for logic programs with negation this restriction does a ect the resulting inferences, and may lead to a number of unnatural features. For example, in modularized software, the interpretation of the rules in a module should not exclude the possibility of objects not known to the module. Some researchers have suggested weakening this domain assumption. In this paper we shall consider various weaker forms of that domain assumptions, and we shall investigate how the choice of domain assumption a ects the axiomatization of logic programming semantics described above.
Related Work
It has long been accepted that a logic program, particularly one with negative subgoals, carries a certain amount of implicit information. Clark was the rst to formalize a method to make this implicit content explicit, by de ning a completed l o gic program to be associated with the original 9 . Reiter's closed world assumption is somewhat related 37 . Independently, McCarthy proposed the concept of circumscription to capture the implicit common sense" element i n a n y rst order sentence not necessarily a logic program that was intended roughly as a statement of knowledge about the world" 28, 29 . Whereas Clark remained within a rst order framework, McCarthy used a second order formula. To a large extent, subsequent research has re ned one of these fundamental approaches in an attempt to cure various perceived problems in circumscription 22, 31, 24, 23, 1 7 , 1 8 or program completion 45, 11, 19, 26, 46, 2 0 . Strati ed semantics 3, 4 8 and its generalizations, such as stable models 12 and well-founded semantics 50 , constitute a vein that has seen considerable recent activity 34, 8 , 1 5 , 3 5 , 2 5 , 3 8 , 4 4 , 49, 33, 42, 40, 43, 6 . One of the main motivations for this type of semantics is that complements of many inductive de nitions have their natural expression, a feature lacking in all of the program completion approaches. Example 5.1 illustrates this idea with the complement of transitive closure of a directed graph.
Two other active areas deserve mention, although they are not closely related to the issues studied in this paper. One is the study of logic programs without function symbols, often called deductive databases 7, 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 , 1 6 , 10, 21, 15 . Another is the study of disjunctive logic programs 30, 4 1 , 3 6 , 39, 33 .
Summary of Results
In Section 5 we propose a new second order axiom that formalizes common sense" di erently from traditional circumscription. Rather than minimality, it addresses lack of support. One form of this axiom leads to stable models; another leads to well-founded models.
In Section 6 we show that certain in nite sets of axioms that are customarily used to constrain the universes of models have nite presentations, a fact that may facilitate implementations and automated proofs of properties.
Stable and well-founded models, as presented in previous literature, are always de ned given xed universes, almost always Herbrand universes. Thus obtaining either stable or well-founded models requires an additional axiom to constrain the universe or domain of interpretation. One su cient constraint is that the universe be an isomorphic copy of the Herbrand universe. As noted above, in many settings such a constraint is unnatural. Therefore, an alternative i s i n vestigated in Section 7, which w e call the domain foundation axiom. This axiom does not specify any particular universe, though it speci es that some of the properties of the Herbrand universe hold. We show that the domain closure requirement can be factored" into the domain foundation axiom and a rst order nameability axiom. Figure 1 summarizes the relationships found among various axiomatizations studied in the paper.
Preliminaries and Terminology
We assume familiarity with the common terminology of logic programming, but review some speci cs, and describe our notation and basic de nitions.
Rule Format
A Horn logic program may be thought of as a nite set of rules, exactly one for each predicate symbol, in the form:
q i x i i x i i = 1 ; : : : ; n where eachx i is a vector of distinct variables, x 1 i ; x 2 i ; : : : , formula q i x i , called the head of the rule, is an atomic formula, and i x i , called the body of the rule, is a positive, existential, formula of rst order logic with equality, whose free variables are exactlyx i . That is, the rule body is built from atomic formulas atoms connected by logical and &, or _, and existential quanti ers. The propositional constants true and false may also be used for rule bodies. The backwards implication symbol is conveniently read as if". Square brackets are sometimes used as well as parentheses to delimit scope. Should some predicate q i not otherwise appear in the head of a rule, we shall have the vacuous rule q i false. The reason for this slightly unorthodox description will soon become evident.
De nition 2.1: The rule bodies of a program may contain function symbols of arity 1 and constant symbols. The set of all such symbols is called the functional vocabulary or just vocabulary" of the program, denoted L P . F requently, w e shall consider functional vocabularies L i containing additional symbols not present in the program. Several symbols will require the vocabulary L i as a modi er e.g., F, to be de ned later. To a void double subscripts, we just use the subscript of L on the other symbol e.g., F i instead of F Li . Also, the absence of a subscript indicates the symbol is associated with L P .
Example 2.1: The following program de nes e as an directed edge relation on three nodes, a, b, and c, and The functional vocabulary of the program is L P = fa; b; cg.
In deductive database settings e is called an extensional database predicate because it can be rewritten as a nite set of ground facts, ea; b, eb; a, and ec; c. In such settings, the rule for e is often regarded as part of the input, not part of the program. For this paper, the rule for e is part of the program, and indeed, every predicate must have exactly one rule in the program.
There are several natural ways to extend the Horn rule format to introduce nonmonotonicity. W e are primarily concerned with the extension to normal logic programs, in the terminology of Lloyd 26 . This extension permits rule bodies to be built from positive and negative literals where Horn rules are limited to atoms, or positive literals, connected by and", or", and existential quanti ers; essentially, only universal quanti ers are absent. A closely related extension, general logic programs, permits rule bodies to be any rst order formula. Lloyd and Topor used the terms generalized clause" and extended clause" where we use normal" and general" 27 . A quite di erent road is taken with disjunctive logic programs, which permit the head of a rule to be a disjunction of atoms 30 .
Although we shall transform a normal logic program into a form that contains rst order formulas, we wish to emphasize that the original program consists of normal rules only.
Notational Conventions
Some additional notational conventions follow. In all cases, when it is clear from the context, the symbols may represent vectors of the designated objects; e.g., often represents a vector of formulas, R often represents a v ector of predicate variables, etc. predicate variables of second order formulas are written using uppercase letters R, : : : , Z. generic program predicates are denoted with q.
As usual, the symbols = and 6 = are the logical symbols for true equality and inequality of elements of the universe.
In program examples, any l o wercase letter or word may represent a predicate or a function symbol, when the syntax dictates this meaning. We emphasize again that each relation symbolq i must appear in the head of a unique rule q i x i x.
Several notations that are introduced as they are needed are mentioned here for ease of cross reference.
The notationq is de ned in De nition 3.1. Here we emphasize that is not a vector notation, and is not an operator.
The immediate consequence operator T PP is introduced in De nition 3.4.
Functional vocabulary notations, including the avoidance of double subscripting, are discussed in De nition 2.1.
A unary predicate whose rule de nes the Herbrand universe is denoted by hx and its rule body is H x De nition 4.2.
The formula Fx; y is used to de ne functional edges De nition 6.1.
The formula w x is used for the domain foundation axiom De nition 7.2.
To streamline notation when no confusion will arise, we m a y drop subscripts and omit arrows over vectors. For example, the n generic program rules may be abbreviated to qx x By doing so we do not intend to limit the discussion to programs with a single unary predicate. Similarly, R normally denotes an n-vector of predicate variables, with each R i corresponding to q i in arity.
De nition 2.2: It is necessary to have a concise notation for syntactic substitutions in formulas. If x i s a formula, then the notation q 1 = 1 ; : : : ; q k = k x denotes the formula obtained by replacing each occurrence of the predicate symbolq i by the formula i with appropriate uni cation. That is, if an occurrence of q i has as arguments the k-vector of terms t, then i has k free variables, y, and i t is substituted for q i t. In usage, i will usually be a predicate variable, R i , o r a predicate constant true or false.
As usual, if q is the vector q 1 ; : : : ; q n w e write q=R for q 1 =R 1 ; : : : ; q n =R n x. Similarly may denote a vector of formulas, each receiving the same substitution.
As a nal notational shorthand, we shall use set operations to abbreviate certain second order formulas.
A t ypical example is R to abbreviate 8x Rx ! x , which in turn is really an abbreviation for
Clark introduced the idea of replacing an if" rule by its if and only if" counterpart. We i n troduce dualized rules and programs to achieve a somewhat weaker e ect. 1 The dualized program serves as a common point of departure for various semantics. Although the original program consists of normal rules only, i.e., rules whose bodies are existentially quanti ed conjunctions of literals, the dualized program may contain universal quanti ers and disjunctions.
The rst step of dualization is replace each negative literal :qt in the rule body bỹ qt; :t = u i s replaced by t 6 = u. Sinceq and 6 = are regarded as new predicate symbols, this actually removes all negation from the program. We call q and = positive predicates and callq and 6 = tilde predicates. The rules that result, denoted as a set by P, are called the positive rules.
De nition 3.1: For any formula in which negation is absent, the dual of , denoted by, is de ned inductively:
1. Atoms qt andqt are duals; t = u and t 6 = u are duals; true and false are duals.
2. The dual of & i s _~ ; the dual of _ i s &~ .
3. The dual of 9x x i s 8xx; the dual of 8x x i s 9xx.
The de nition extends to all formulas by rst pushing negations down to the atoms, then replacing :q bỹ q, and nally applying the above de nition to construct the dual.
The tilde rule corresponding to positive rule qx x i s qx ~ x, where~ x is the dual formula of x. The set of tilde rules corresponding to P is denotedP.
The tilde ruleqx ~ x can be thought of as the only if" version of qx x. The initial form of the only if" rule is qx ! x. However, its contrapositive form is :qx : x, which leads to the tilde rule by pushing down negations in the rule body and replacing negative literals by tilde atoms. Traditionally in logic programming, distinct ground terms are assumed to name distinct objects. With ordinary de nite clause programs not involving = or 6 =, this assumption makes no di erence in traditional semantics. Here, due to the introduction of universal quanti ers and the presence of 6 =", it is important t o rule out models in which syntactically di erent terms collapse to the same interpreted object. The standard way to do this is to append the Clark Equality Theory, which forces syntactically di erent v ariable-free terms to be interpreted as di erent objects 9, 4, 19, 26 . This is achieved by i n troducing an in nite recursive set of rst order sentences, which depend on the functional vocabulary of the program. They are often called the Clark Equality Axioms CEA or the equality freeness axioms.
De nition 3.2: The Clark equality axioms CEA for a given functional vocabulary L consist of the following inequalities. For simplicity of presentation, we give them for a vocabulary that contains just one constant a, one unary function g, and one binary function symbol f. 8x 1 x 2 x 1 6 = x 2 ! gx 1 6 = gx 2 8x 1 y 1 x 2 y 2 x 1 6 = x 2 _ y 1 6 = y 2 ! fx 1 ; y 1 6 = fx 2 ; y 2 8x gx 6 = a 8xy fx; y 6 = a 8xyz fx; y 6 = gz For a nite vocabulary, this constraint consists of a nite number of axioms.
2. The acyclicity constraint consists of axioms that prevent a n y term being equal to a proper subterm of itself. This constraint is usually presented as an in nite set of inequalities, even for nite vocabularies 9, 26 : 8x x 6 = gx 8xy x 6 = fx; y & x 6 = fy;x 8x x 6 = ggx 8xy x 6 = fgx; y & x 6 = fy;gx 8xy x 6 = gfx; y & x 6 = gfy;x 8xyz x 6 = ffx; y; z & x 6 = ffy;x; z & x 6 = fz;fx; y & x 6 = fz;fy;x : : : : : :
It will be instructive later Section 6 to study a nite presentation of the acyclicity constraint.
The generalization to arbitrary vocabularies should be obvious. De nition 3.3: The dualized p r ogram associated with a given logic program P, is denoted by P;P; CEA;
it is the set of formulas consisting of the positive and tilde rules, together with the Clark equality axioms. If the dualized program is interpreted in a universe of one element, thenpa m ust be true; whereas if it is interpreted in a larger universe, then pa m ust be true. Note that neither pa norpa is a logical consequence of the dualized program. This program is discussed further in later examples.
Although all rule bodies are positive formulas in the dualized program, P;P is not generally a Horn program due to the presence of universal quanti cation. However, it is an inductive system as studied by Moschovakis 32 . The familiar immediate consequence operator associated with the dualized program may be de ned using the formula named T PP below. Since T PP is de ned on the dualized program, it is the analogue of Fitting's three-valued immediate consequence operator P 11 , but stated in the language of dualized programs. We discuss Fitting's semantics in Section 4. With some abuse of notation we use the same symbol for the operator as for its de ning formula. This operator is monotonic and has a least xpoint, denoted by T 1 PP , i n a n y structure for P;P; CEA.
De nition 3.4: Let P be a program given by the rules qx x, where q is an n-vector of predicate symbols. Recall that x i s a v ector x 1 ; : : : ; x n o f v ectors of individual variables; each x i has the arity o f q i . Let y have the same arities as x, and let R andR n-vectors of predicate variables have the same arities as q. Then, T PP R;Rx; y def = q=R;q=R x;~ q=R;q=R y that is, the vector of second order formulas: 1 q=R;q=R x 1 : : : n q=R;q=R x n 1 q=R;q=R y 1 : : : n q=R;q=R y n The immediate consequence operator for P;P is de ned by this formula in the obvious way: For input relations r;r of the same arities as q over some structure, the output of T PP viewed as an operator is the 2n-vector of relations, the sets of all tuples that satisfy 1 ; : : : ; n ;~ 1 ; : : : ;~ n when R are interpreted by r andR are interpreted bỹ r. The free variables of each formula have the same name except for superscripts. We hope this example illustrates our motivation to streamline the notation! The associated immediate consequence operator transforms a 4-vector of binary relations into another 4-vector of binary relations. To e v aluate the operator, interpret R 1 ; R 2 ;R 1 ;R 2 as the input 4-vector. These 4-vectors intuitively correspond to p; e;p;ẽ.
Program Completion Semantics
From the dualized program we can re-establish the connection between duals and negation with the aid of two additional rst order axioms.
De nition 4.1: The disjointness and totality axioms are disjoint def = :9x qx & qx= ; total def = 8x qx _qx
We remind the reader that the axioms are presented in abbreviated form for programs with several predicates; the unabbreviated forms would have the appropriate conjunctions and subscripts.
Clark proposed a semantics based on the completed p r ogram, which in our notation, adds disjoint and total to the dualized program: compP def = P;P; CEA; disjoint; total Sentences that are logical consequences of the completed program are regarded as true. For query-answering purposes, associateq with :q. Recall that a formula is a logical consequence of a set of axioms if and only if it is true in all models of those axioms not just Herbrand models.
One problem with the completed program is that it might be inconsistent. While the examples of this phenomenon, such a s p : p, might appear silly as programs, inconsistency can arise in quite reasonable programs. For this single rule, the dualized rules are p p andp p. The dualized program has two models, but compP is inconsistent. However, it is straightforward to show that disjoint can cause inconsistency only in conjunction with total;
that is, an easy induction argument shows that the least xpoint o f T PP on any structure that satis es CEA is a model of P;P; CEA; disjoint. Fitting and Kunen considered variations of program completion that essentially discarded total, although their work was presented in terms of three-valued logic. With total gone, a simple argument shows that the addition of disjoint to the dualized program does not constrain the logical consequences: the least xpoint o f T PP on the Herbrand universe is always a model of the dualized program that satis es disjoint. S o disjoint may be ignored also, and we are back to the dualized program P;P; CEA.
It is easy to see that T PP as an operator corresponds to Fitting's three-valued immediate consequence operator P with just a change of terminology. Just associate atomsq here with negative literals :q, and observe that :q belongs to the output of P just whenq belongs to the output of T PP . There are two important di erences between the Fitting and Kunen semantics, one of which is quite subtle.
Domain Closure Axioms
The Fitting semantics essentially limits the domain of interpretation to the Herbrand universe; it speci es that the true facts are precisely those in T 1 PP , the least xpoint of the immediate consequence operator, on that universe 11 . We n o w describe this semantics in terms of logical consequences of a second order formula.
Membership in the Herbrand universe can be de ned inductively. As is well-known, the inductive closure of hx H x is not rst order de nable, but is expressed by the second order formula
The rst conjunct states that h is a xpoint, and the second conjunct the second order part of the formula constrains h to be contained in any xpoint. The goal of a domain closure axiom is to force the any model of the above rule to make h true for the whole universe. First, notice that the weaker requirement that the universe be a xpoint of the rule is expressed by 8x H h=true x, which axiom is considered later under the name dca fo . H o wever, to require that the universe be the least xpoint requires a second order axiom, such as the following. Recall that the operator T PP is the analogue of Fitting's P operator. It follows that the Fitting semantics can be de ned as the logical consequences of the dualized program conjoined with the above domain closure axiom: P;P; CEA; dca.
Kunen's Logical Consequence Semantics
Kunen has also proposed a semantics based on Fitting's P operator T PP in this paper's notation 19 .
The well-recognized di erence between the Fitting and Kunen semantics is that Fitting uses T 1 PP , the least xpoint, whereas Kunen uses T ! PP . There is another subtle di erence: Kunen requires the logic program to be expressed in a vocabulary L with a countably in nite set of function symbols of each arity. This has the e ect of preventing the nite de nition of domain closure!
The in nite set of function symbols in L can be introduced by using CEA, an extended set of equality axioms that mentions these function symbols as well as those that occur in the program. The Kunen semantics is de ned as the logical consequences of P;P; CEA. One of Kunen's main theorems 19, Theorem 6.3 states that this semantics corresponds to T ! PP which m a y not be a xpoint! on the Herbrand universe of L : Theorem 4.1: Kunen Let P,P, T PP , L and CEA be as de ned above, and let I be the Herbrand interpretation in which the universe is generated by L and the relations are speci ed by T ! PP . Then sentence is a logical consequence of P;P; CEA if and only if evaluates to true in I.
The next example 50 shows that the Fitting and Kunen semantics are actually incomparable; neither is contained in the other. plus CEA. First, note that neither pa norpa is a logical consequence of P;P; CEA. The Fitting semantics and Kunen semantics further constrain the models in di erent w ays, leading to di erent results. The atompa is true in all Herbrand models, hence is true in the Fitting semantics, as it is a logical consequence of P;P; CEA; dca. However, pa is true in all models on in nite universes, hence is true in Kunen semantics, as it is a logical consequence of P;P; CEA. As both semantics respect disjoint, they are incomparable on this program.
Finally, since P;P; CEA is a subset of both P;P; CEA; dca and P;P; CEA, its set of consequences is always a subset of sets of consequences of both the preceding two and in this case is a proper subset of them both.
It is not always clear whether requiring the program to be interpreted in a universe with in nitely many unknown" objects agrees with the user's intentions. This question is discussed in Section 7.
A Limitation of Program Completion
None of the program completion semantics capture the complement of an inductive closure, even over a nite set, in a natural way. The well worn example is the complement of transitive closure on a nite directed graph 48, 2 0 , 5 0 , as may be seen from Example 3.1. This fact is perhaps the primary motivation for exploring other semantics. We examine some recent proposals in Section 5.
A Common Sense" Axiom
McCarthy observed that in everyday common sense" reasoning, people treat a statement as false if there is no foundation for believing it to be true 28 . Thus from the rule healthy birds can y, except penguins" and the fact Tweety is a healthy bird", the common sense conclusion is that Tweety can y, because there is no reason to believe that Tweety is a penguin. He formalized this practice by adding an axiom requiring models to be minimal with respect to certain predicates.
For logic programs, we propose a di erent axiom, one that goes more directly to the point that there is no reason to believe" something. Informally, a set of facts that we h a ve no reason to believe" are called unsupported. W e i n tend to accept models only if they satisfy a well-supported set axiom, which requires all sets of unsupported facts about the original predicates of the program have dualized facts that are true in the model. That is, if pa is in an unsupported set, then the well-supported set axiom requires thatpa m ust be in the model. This is the common sense" axiom that we believe captures the spirit of circumscription more accurately than the usual relation-minimization axioms.
Unsupported Set Axiom
The unsupported set axiom is essentially a generalization of the notion of unfounded set 50 to arbitrary domains. The reader is advised to study the example that follows to see the motivation and get a feeling for how the de nition works. Various technical meanings for supported" and unsupported" appear in the literature; care must be taken not to confuse them with the one that follows.
De nition 5.1: Let P be a given logic program with generic rule qx x. The unsupported set axiom for U with respect to S andS is: unsupU; S;S def = U ~ q=S;q=S _ U Here we use the substitution notation from Section 2.2; an occurrenceqt is replaced by St _ Ut, where t i s a v ector of terms. Observe that unsup depends implicitly on P through q, q and~ . I n tuitively, given a model with S;S true, unsup states that U is able to rederive itself" as additional tilde atoms. Let us use the notation q = p; e, = p ; e , and U = U p ; U e to be speci c. Let the universe be a; b; c; a . Only one disjoint pair of relations e 0 ;ẽ 0 on this universe satis es the rules for e andẽ, namely those that interpret e x; y and~ e x; y, respectively.
Consider an interpretation for U whose components are de ned by U p = fa; c; a; a ; b; c; b; a g and U e = ;. Then unsupU; ;; e 0 ; ;;ẽ 0 def = U p ~ p p=;; e=e 0 ;p=U p ;ẽ=ẽ 0 U e & U e ~ e p=;; e=e 0 ;p=U p ;ẽ=ẽ 0 U e Of course, the second conjunct is satis ed trivially. The rst conjunct written in more detail becomes 8xy U p x; y ! ẽ 0 x; y & 8z U p x; z _ U p z;y This conjunct also is true for U p as given. Thus the unsupported set axiom, unsupU; ;; e 0 ; ;;ẽ 0 , is satis ed by U = U p ; ;. By monotonicity o f ;~ , unsupU; S;S holds for any S;S that contains e 0 ;ẽ 0 .
Note that U p is contained in the complement of the transitive closure of e in the given universe. If U p were any smaller, and nonempty, the axiom would not hold. However, it could be enlarged to the entire complement of the transitive closure, and the axiom would hold, and this is true for all universes that contain the Herbrand universe. View a as a generic extra term, and the details are straightforward.
It is important that unsupU; ;; e 0 ; ;;ẽ 0 holds only for U p that are contained in the complement o f the transitive closure. To see that this is indeed the case, rst note that U p must be a subset ofẽ 0 for the axiom to have a c hance, so assume this is the case. Now i f s 1 ; t 2 U p and is in the transitive closure, there is an edge s 1 ; s 2 that is part of a simple path of length n 1 from s 1 to t. T h us U p s 1 ; s 2 m ust be false, and it is necessary that U p s 2 ; t be true for the axiom to hold. But there is a path from s 2 to t of length n , 1, so there is an edge s 2 ; s 3 that forces U p s 3 ; t to be true, and so on. Eventually, s n ; t is forced to be in U p , but is also an edge, contradicting the assumption that U p is contained inẽ 0 .
In summary, the complement of the transitive closure is the maximum unsupported set with respect to e 0 ;ẽ 0 .
The observation in the previous example can be generalized to all positive existential inductive de nitions Horn programs, as well as to strati ed programs. The arguments are omitted, as they have been given elsewhere in connection with the well-founded semantics 50, Theorems 3.7 and 6.1 . Although those proofs were phrased in terms of unfounded sets, rather than unsupported sets, no new ideas are involved. The connection between unsupported sets and unfounded sets is discussed next.
Unfounded sets were de ned as part of the well-founded semantics 50 . They were de ned within the Herbrand universe, although the de nition can be applied in other universes. In this section, a, b, and c will denote ground variable-free terms, not necessarily constant symbols. The de nition is given here in terms of the dualized program. The cited paper should be consulted for additional details and motivation. The relationship to unsupported sets is illustrated in the lemma that follows the de nitions. Intuitively, for xed i and a, the witnesses of unusability for all j collectively demonstrate that q i a cannot be the rst atom in U to be derived starting from S;S. The mappingŨS;S is de ned bỹ US;S def = fq i a j a 2 U i such that U is unfounded w.r.t. S;Sg Note that this maps a pair of vectors of relations into a vector of tilde relations.
The well-founded t r ansformation WS;S combines the positive immediate consequences withŨ:
WS;S def = q=S;q=S ;ŨS;S and its least xpoint gives the well-founded dualized m o del 50 .
Observe that, if U is unfounded w.r.t. S;S, then no element o f U can be the rst element o f U to be derived in a positive relation as long as the positive and tilde relations that represent the current set of beliefs" remain disjoint and are supersets of S;S. Furthermore, this remains true even after the tuples of U are added to the tilde relations. In this sense, it is safe" to put U's tuples in the tilde relations.
What is called the well-founded partial model" in the original nomenclature is called the well-founded dualized model" here because it is actually a two-valued model of the dualized program. However, it may not satisfy the totality axiom, total. One theorem we shall use is that stable models are precisely the xpoints of W that do satisfy total 50, Theorem 5.4 .
The next lemma shows that unsupported sets are essentially a generalization of unfounded sets to arbitrary domains. Suppose U is unfounded. The domain closure axiom forces 8y j in~ i to range only over ground Herbrand terms. For x = a and y j = b j , the witness of unusability causes someL jk q=S;q=S _ U to evaluate to true, and there is one witness for each conjunct j.
Suppose U is unsupported. Then for each q i a 2 U, the body~ i a m ust be true, so each conjunct j must be true, so for all terms b j some literalL jk q=S;q=S _ U a; b j m ust be true. Whichever literal is true is the witness of unusability. F or example, if the literal isq m c and c 2 U m , it meets condition 2; other cases meet condition 1.
Several di erent xpoint constructions of the well-founded semantics have appeared in the literature. Przymusinski has given one that involves the greatest xpoint of an operator based on~ 35 , and has shown see Theorem 3.2 there that it de nes the well-founded semantics. Although the notation is rather di erent, we shall use essentially the same idea to characterize the greatest unsupported set.
Greatest xpoints are not as widely used as least xpoints. We shall use the following standard properties that are analogs of least xpoint properties 32, 2 :
Fact A A monotone operator on a lattice has a greatest xpoint.
Fact B The greatest xpoint of a universally quanti ed positive induction i.e., the carrier appears only positively, and not under an existential quanti er closes within ! stages.
Fact C If G is the greatest xpoint of the monotonic transformation T, where " is the partial order on the lattice, and R TR, then R G.
Recall that a set U is unsupported with respect to S andS if it satis es: U ~ q=S;q=S _ U De nition 5.1. Now add to the language a vector u of extra predicates for the sets U, and consider the formula~ q;q=q _ u . By construction, u occurs only positively in this formula. Moreover, the formula has only universal quanti cation if any, because , as a normal rule body, m a y contain only existential quanti cation.
Hence, for any structure jMj, with xed interpretations S;S o f q;q, there is a greatest xed point G of the formula; that is, G is the greatest set vector of relations, actually U that satis es U =~ q=S;q=S _ U .
Lemma 5.2: The greatest xpoint G just described is the union of all sets U that satisfy U ~ q=S;q=S _ U on jMj. T h us it is the greatest unsupported set with respect to S andS. Moreover, G is de nable by a n induction that closes within ! stages.
Proof: By Fa c t C a b o ve, any unsupported set is contained in G. But G, being a xpoint the formula, is itself an unsupported set. Closure within ! follows from Fact B above.
The greatest xed point G above can be constructed in universe jMj for given S;S b y induction, in the standard fashion: U 0 = jMj k for whatever the appropriate arity k is. U n+1 =~ q=S;q=S _ U n .
This U ! is the desired greatest unsupported set. The nite stages of the above constructions can be captured by nitary formulas: 0 x = true, and n+1 x = q=S;q=S _ n .
Well-Supported Set Axiom
We n o w formulate an axiom to require that all unsupported sets are contained in corresponding tilde relations. This is the common sense" axiom that we believe captures the spirit of circumscription more accurately than the usual relation-minimization axioms.
De
wellsupR;R def = 8U unsupU; R;R ! U R Observe that wellsup depends implicitly on P through unsup.
Intuitively, for a set of beliefs" R;R t o b e w ell-supported, any unsupported set U with respect to R;R m ust be contained inR.
Certain relationships between the wellsup axiom and stable and well-founded models can be shown. These relationships apply to so-called augmented" programs as well as the original programs. A simple way to incorporate unknown" objects is to form the augmented program 50 :
De nition 5.4: Given a dualized set of rules P;P, the associated augmented p r ogram is obtained by rst adding the rule: aug def = p g a p g a to the program, where p , g , and a , are new symbols, not in P. This produces a new functional vocabulary, L = L P f a ; g g, with corresponding Clark equality axioms, denoted as CEA. Thus the augmented program is P;P; aug; CEA. Predicate p is considered neither a positive nor a tilde predicate; it just functions as a carrier" for g and a . Clearly it can always be interpreted as the empty relation.
If domain closure De nition 4.3 is to be used, it is de ned with respect to L , and is denoted as dca.
Theorem 5.3: Let a dualized possibly augmented program be given, and append the domain closure axiom, and the axiom wellsupq;q. The logical consequences of the resulting set of axioms, which i s P;P; CEA; wellsupq;q; dca for the non-augmented program or P;P; aug; CEA; wellsupq;q; dca for the augmented program, agree with the well-founded dualized model in the sense that a ground atom is in the well-founded dualized model if and only if it is a logical consequence of the axioms.
Proof: The domain closure axiom allows us to restrict attention to Herbrand models. Suppose R;R is the well-founded dualized model. By its de nition 50, Section 3 ,R is the union of all sets U that are unfounded with respect to R;R. By Lemma 5.1 all such U are unsupported, so the axiom wellsupR;R holds. Thus the well-founded dualized model is an upper bound on the set of atoms that are logical consequences. Let S;S b e a n y Herbrand model that satis es wellsupq;q. Being a model, we h a ve S;S S, and by the wellsup axiomŨS;S S recall De nition 5.2 forŨ and W. Thus S;S is a pre-xpoint o f W, s o i s a superset of the well-founded dualized model.
Note that we did not append the disjointness axiom to the list of assumptions above. Just as was the case without the axiom wellsup, it is straightforward to show that, for any dualized program P;P; CEA, with any combination of the axioms aug, dca, and wellsup all expressed in appropriate vocabularies, the logical consequences are the same with or without the disjoint axiom. In each case, over any xed universe, the set of consequences can be built up by trans nite induction, and it is routine to show that there can be no rst step where disjoint is violated. However, this axiom, as well as total are needed to obtain stable models.
Theorem 5.4: Let a dualized possibly augmented program be given, and append the domain closure axiom, the totality axiom, the disjointness axiom, and the axiom wellsupq;q. The models of the resulting set of axioms, which i s P;P; CEA; disjoint; total; wellsupq;q; dca for the non-augmented program or P;P; aug; CEA; disjoint; total; wellsupq;q; dca for the augmented program, are precisely the stable models of the original possibly augmented program, withq corresponding to :q. Proof: It is su cient to prove that all models are xpoints of W, and all xpoints of W that satisfy totality and disjointness are models 50, Theorem 5.4 . If R;R is a xpoint o f W, the wellsup axiom holds, as argued in the previous theorem. It easily follows that R;R is a model of the whole formula. Now suppose R;R is a model, implying that q=R;q=R R. I f U def = R , q=R;q=R is nonempty, then we claim it is an unsupported set w.r.t. R;R. By totality and disjointness,~ is true just where is false and vice versa, so U ~ q=R;q=R . So De nition 5.1 holds by monotonicity o f , and the claim follows. Consequently, q=R;q=R = R or disjointness would be violated. Similarly, wellsupR;R implies thatŨR;R R. If it is a proper subset, there is a nonempty set S R such that S q=R;q=R = R as well, again violating disjointness. SoŨR;R = R, and R;R is a xpoint o f W.
One issue that arises with second order axioms is whether countable models exist. In conjunction with dca and CEA, all models must be countable, as their universes are isomorphic copies of the Herbrand universe. However, one motive for taking the axiomatic approach w as to get away from xed universes. It is noteworthy that wellsup has countable models in the sense given next, without the coercion of dca.
Recall that M is an elementary submodel of an arbitrary in nite model N if its universe jMj is a subset of the universe of N, and every rst order formula with k free variables is true in M for tuple m 1 ; : : : ; m k 2 jMj k if and only if it is true in N for the same tuple. By the downward L owenheimSkolem theorem, every in nite model N over a nite or countable vocabulary has a countable elementary submodel M. H o wever, since wellsupq;q is stated in second order logic, we cannot use that result to conclude immediately that, if a set of sentences including wellsupq;q has a model, it has a countable model. However, this property can be proved with the aid of Lemma 5.2 and the construction following it.
Theorem 5.5: Let be a rst order sentence involving just the symbols of the program P;P. If N is any in nite model of P;P; aug; CEA; wellsupq;q f g, and M is a countable elementary model of N, then M is also a model of P;P; aug; CEA; wellsupq;q f g. Proof: Suppose N is an in nite model of P;P; aug; CEA; wellsupq;q f g with universe jNj and interpretations S;S o f q;q. Let M be a countable elementary submodel of N, with interpretations R;R o f q;q.
Since M is an elementary submodel of N, M is a model of the rst order axioms P;P; aug; CEA fg. So it remains only to prove that M is a model of wellsupq;q.
To prove wellsupR;R is satis ed, we m ust show that the greatest unsupported set G M w.r.t R;R, calculated in M, is a subset ofR, the interpretation ofq in M. Suppose not: some tuple x 2 G M ,R; such an x cannot be inS, a s R =S restricted to M. Recall that G M is the intersection of the interpretations of the nitary rst order formulas n given following Lemma 5.2. Since x 2 G M , e v ery n x is true in M. Hence every n x is also true in N, b y the elementary submodel relationship, so x must be in the greatest unsupported set w.r.t S;S i n N. But x 6 2S, s o wellsupq;q i n N is violated. Thus the assumption that G M 6 R is inconsistent, so the theorem is proved.
Finite Presentations
Issues of nite axiomatization might seem like abstract theoretical points, but our study is motivated by quite practical considerations. If the semantics of a logic program can be stated with a nite vocabulary, that should be a great convenience for the development of compilers, interpreters, and automated veri cation tools.
In this section we give alternative nite formulations of CEA and of Kunen's semantics. To simplify the presentation, we sometimes assume that the program contains just one constant a, one unary function symbol g, and one binary function symbol f. This is without loss of generality, as larger vocabularies can be encoded with just the symbols a and f.
Finite Presentation of CEA
For a nite program, the global injectivity constraint can be stated nitely see De nition 3.2. Only the acyclicity constraint, which prevents a term being equal to a proper subterm of itself, requires an in nite number of inequalities. However, an essentially equivalent constraint can be stated nitely in rst-order logic, with the aid of an auxiliary predicate. Similar constructions have been used elsewhere in logical literature.
De nition 6.1: Let L be a given nite functional vocabulary. The following formula, denoted F L x; y, de nes functional edges. F or illustration, we assume L contains one unary function symbol g one binary function symbol f, plus constant symbol a constants do not a ect this de nition. The general case is the obvious extension, including k disjuncts for each k-ary function symbol of L.
F L x; y def = y = gx _ 9 z y = fx; z _ 9 z y = fz;x For functional vocabulary L i , the associated formula is written F i , t o a void double subscripts.
In any structure for L with xed interpretations of the symbols of L, the functional graph is the set of functional edges in the structure that is, ordered pairs of elements m 1 ; m 2 such that F L m 1 ; m 2 i s satis ed. Because F L contains only the equality predicate, there is no need to distinguish between the formula and its interpretation.
For in nite vocabularies, the de nition of F L becomes an in nite length disjunction. When we use F L in de nitions of concepts, that is harmless. In other contexts, such as in the statement o f t h e -acyclicity axioms below, it is possible to get an equivalent de nition by replacing the one axiom involving F L with an in nite collection of nite-length axioms, one for each disjunct in the de nition of F L above.
Clearly, i f Ft 1 ; t 2 holds, then t 1 is a proper subterm of t 2 . H o wever, to identify all proper subterms of t 2 , transitivity is needed.
De nition 6.2: Let be a predicate symbol not occurring in the program. We shall use it as an in x binary predicate, with the intuitive meaning, is a proper subterm of". Let L be a given functional vocabulary. Now the -acyclicity constraint is given by a set of axioms in the following form. The last two lines assert that is transitive and anti-re exive that is, it is a strict partial order. Clearly, i f term t 2 is formed by a n y nite number of function applications from term t 1 and other terms, then t 1 t 2 must hold. Note that this de nition depends implicitly on the vocabulary; when necessary, the intended vocabulary is made explicit in the discussion. However, subscripts to the " symbol denote more than this; see De nition 6.3.
For an in nite vocabulary, an in nite set of axioms replaces the rst line. A -minimum model is one that interprets by its minimum model.
Because the axioms for can be written as Horn clauses including one negative clause they have the model intersection property. If they have a n y model in a given structure, they have a minimum model in that structure, namely the transitive closure of the functional graph. The transitive closure is de ned by the well-known least xpoint, and every tuple in it is derived" at some nite stage. Thus -minimum" i s w ell de ned above.
However, we do not in general require to be interpreted by its least xpoint; that would require a second order axiom. It is su cient for our purposes that any model contains the least xpoint. For each such model, there is a -minimum" model, which i n terprets all relations as in the original model except that it interprets by its least xpoint. Although the axioms do not restrict models to be -minimum, certain properties of -minimum models will be useful.
De nition 6.3: Let M be a structure for vocabulary L and predicate symbol , a s w ell as the symbols of program P. The minimum relation satisfying De nition 6.2 is denoted L . T o a void double subscripting, for L i the minimum relation is denoted i , rather than Li . In particular: P is associated with L P the vocabulary of the original program in question; is associated with L ; is associated with L ; 1 is associated with L 1 , etc. Moreover, any model without a relation that satis es that acyclicity constraint can be extended to a -minimum" model.
Proof: 1 Start with a model satisfying the -acyclicity constraint. Clearly, the interpretation of must contain the transitive closure of the functional graph De nition 6.1. Now i f a n y acyclicity axiom of De nition 3.2, say x 6 = tx, were violated, it would produce a sequence of functional edges from the occurrence of x in t to the root of t that constitute a cycle. Thus x x would be satis ed, contradicting the hypothesis.
2 The transitive closure of the functional edge relation satis es the rst two requirements for . If there were a nite sequence of functional edges from any x to itself, we could read o a violation of the acyclicity constraint of De nition 3.2 from the cycle, so the transitive closure must be acyclic. Finally, as noted above, the transitive closure of the functional edge relation must be the minimal such relation.
Therefore, whether CEA is interpreted to contain the original acyclicity constraint or the -acyclicity constraint, the logical consequences of the program are not a ected as far as symbols other than are concerned.
The axiom set CEA used for the Kunen semantics has no nite presentation, as it covers an in nite set of symbols. We shall show that the Kunen semantics can nevertheless be nitely presented.
Technical Lemmas
As tools for demonstrating a nite presentation of Kunen's semantics Theorem 6.7, we look brie y at the structure of models of CEA and an additional binary relation or , on functional vocabularies that include all symbols of P and possibly additional symbols. The relation or , written as an in x operator, helps to identify elements of the universe that are not built up from the functional vocabulary of P alone. Essentially, these elements will enable us to transform models on in nite vocabularies to models on nite vocabularies.
We shall use x y and x v y as abbreviations for x = y _ x y and x = y _ x y, respectively. The import of the above de nition is that, if L 1 is an expanding vocabulary for L P , then the corresponding CEA 1 forces the existence of in nitely many objects not forced to exist by CEA.
We conjecture that the de nition of expanding vocabulary" can be generalized to include the case where L 1 contains in nitely many constants not in L P , but no new functions. This case might b e o f i n terest to deductive database theory. However, the proof of Lemma 6.2 would break down, and this is needed for Lemma 6.5. Overcoming the technical di culties appears to require advanced techniques of recursive function theory and recursively saturated models 5 , which are beyond the scope of this paper. Lemma 6.2: Let P be a logic program with vocabulary L P . Let L 1 be any expanding vocabulary for L P . Let M 1 be any model for P;P; CEA 1 , with universe jMj. F or each constant symbol a or function symbol f of L 1 , let jaj or jfj denote its interpretation in M 1 . De ne P as in De nition 6.3.
2. For each k-ary f 2 L 1 , L P and each k-tuple m of elements of elements jMj, jfjm is unnameable in L P .
3. In nitely many elements of jMj are unnameable in L P .
4. Every element o f jMj that is unnameable in L P is P -minimal.
Proof: 1 3 are a straightforward consequences of CEA 1 . F or 4, by the fact that an element that is unnameable in L P cannot have a functional edge of F P entering it, it is P -minimal.
We n o w i n troduce the notions of weakly dominated by" and dispersed minimal set", which are purely technical tools for the proofs that follow.
De nition 6.6: Let be any partial order on set S. Call x a -minimal element of S if there is no z 2 S such that z x.
Let U and V be subsets of S. W e s a y U is weakly dominated b y V under if, for each u 2 U there is a v 2 V such that u v.
We call U a dispersed minimal set for if U is a subset of -minimal elements of S that is not weakly dominated under by a n y nite subset of S.
Observe that any dispersed minimal set must be in nite, because it is weakly dominated by itself. Lemma 6.3: Let P be a logic program with vocabulary L P . Let L 1 be an expanding language for L P . Let M 1 be any model for P;P; CEA 1 , with universe jMj. De Therefore, the subset of jMj that is unnameable in P is a dispersed minimal set for P . Proof: Let 1 be the minimum relation for L 1 De nition 6.3, and let f be a function in L 1 , L P . For notational simplicity, w e assume f is binary. Let jfj be the interpretation of f. Let m j be a maximal element o f C with respect to 1 which m ust exist since C is nite and nonempty. Set m 0 = jfjm j ; m j . If m 0 v P m i is true for any m i 2 C, then m j 1 m i , contradicting maximality.
The subset of jMj that is unnameable in P call it U i s P -minimal by Lemma 6.3. For any nonempty, nite C jMj, a n m 0 2 U can be chosen as above to demonstrate that U is not weakly dominated by C. Example 6.1: Let S be the set of all pairs i; j, !;j, i; !, where i and j are natural numbers and ! is the rst in nite ordinal. Let u; v x; y hold when u x and v y in the standard order. Then f0; 2; 1; 1g is weakly dominated by f2; 3g and f0; 2; 1; 1; 2; 0g is weakly dominated by f2; 3; 2; 0g.
Here -minimal elements are those of the forms 0; x and x; 0. For U to be a dispersed minimal set, it must be the union of in nite subsets of both minimal forms; for example, if only a nite number of elements of the form 0; x are in U, let the largest such nite x be less than the integer n 0; ! m a y also be present.
But now U is weakly dominated by the nite set f0; ! ; !;ng. Lemma 6.4: Let i,1 be a partial order on an in nite set S and let U i,1 be a dispersed minimal set for i,1 . Let C i,1 = fr 1 ; : : : ; r k g be a nite subset of S. Suppose r 2 U i,1 is such that r 6 i,1 r i for all r i 2 C i,1 . Let i be the transitive closure of i,1 fr 1 r; : : : ; r k rg. Let U i be U i,1 , f rg. Then i is a strict partial order on S and U i is a dispersed minimal set for i .
Proof: First, we claim that i is a strict partial order. It is transitive b y de nition. If there is a cycle s i s for any s 2 S, i t m ust involve an edge r i r for some i. F ollow the cycle from r over edges of i,1 until it reaches some r j possibly j = i such that the next edge in the cycle is r j r. This sequence of edges shows that r i,1 r j , contradicting the choice of r. T h us i is also acyclic, proving the claim.
Clearly, U i is in nite and consists of i,1 -minimal elements of S. All of these except r are also iminimal.
Finally, suppose that U i were weakly dominated under i by some nite subset C i . Then U i,1 would be weakly dominated under i,1 by C i C i,1 , contradicting the hypothesis of the lemma. Example 6.2: Continuing Example 6.1, let 0 be from that example, and let U 0 be the set of all elements of the form 0; x o r x; 0. Let C 0 = f2; 2g. Then a possible choice of r is 0; 3, which leads to 1 having the new relationships: 2; 2 0; 3, 2; 2 1; k , 2; 2 2; k , for all k 4.
Finite Presentation of Kunen Semantics
We h a ve considered two w ays to add to the functional vocabulary of the program, nitely with CEA and in nitely with CEA. This section shows that models can be transformed between the two v ocabularies without changing the interpretation of any symbol in P. While this seems quite plausible, there are technical di culties due to the fact that the functional graph De nition 6.2 need not be well-founded, so straightforward inductive constructions do not work.
Recall that L denotes the vocabulary of P with the additional constant a and unary function g , that CEA is de ned over this vocabulary, and that elements of a universe are called nameable in L if they are in the range of the interpretation of some constant or function of L . Lemma 6.5: Let be a rst order sentence involving just the symbols of the program P;P. Let L P be the vocabulary of P, and let L be that vocabulary augmented with constant a and unary function g . Let L 1 be any expanding vocabulary for L P , and let CEA 1 be based on L 1 . I f P;P; CEA 1 f : g has a model M 1 with universe jMj, then P;P; aug; CEA f : g has a model. Further, if jMj is countable, the new model can be chosen so that it has the same universe, and every element of the universe is nameable in L .
Proof: By the downward L owenheim-Skolem theorem, it su ces to restrict attention to countable models. We shall construct an interpretation jg j for g and form a new structure M b y discarding the interpretations of symbols in CEA 1 that are not in P, adding ja j and jg j, i n terpreting p as the empty relation, and leaving everything else as in M 1 . It follows immediately that M is a model of P;P; aug and :.
We shall construct the ranges of ja j and jg j to be exactly the set of elements of jMj that are unnameable in L P . Because CEA 1 is an expanding language for L P , that set is in nite. We shall also construct jg j to be 1-1; this will satisfy the global injectivity constraints of the CEA. Finally, a s w e construct jg j, w e shall also construct a partial order which will show the acyclicity constraint of CEA to be satis ed.
Enumerate the elements of jMj as m 1 ; m 2 ; : : : , i n a n y order. Let u 0 ; u 1 ; u 2 ; : : : be the subsequence of this sequence consisting of all elements of jMj that are unnameable in L P . The interpretation of L P is retained from M 1 . Choose u 0 as the interpretation of a .
Let U 0 be the set fu 1 ; u 2 ; : : : g; w e need to de ne jg j to be a 1-1 function from jMj onto U 0 . De ne 0 = P see De nition 6.3. We shall extend 0 to a new strict partial order that satis es De nition 6.2
for L , thereby showing that M satis es the acyclicity constraint of CEA. We construct jg j inductively, for stages ranging over the natural numbers, with di erent cases for even and odd. For stage 0, jg j is totally unde ned. We preserve the following invariant properties: At stage = 2 n , 1: If jg jm n is not already de ned, de ne it as follows. Pick u i 2 U 2n,2 of least index such that u i 6 2n,2 m n ; such a u i must exist since U 2n,2 is dispersed minimal. Set jg jm n = u i . Set U 2n,1 = U 2n,2 , f u i g and 2n,1 to be the transitive closure of 2n,2 fm n u i g If jg jm n w as already de ned, set U 2n,1 = U 2n,2 and 2n,1 = 2n,2 . Note that property 5 is trivially preserved under this de nition.
At stage = 2 n: If jg j ,1 u n is not already de ned, de ne u n to be the rst of the following expressions which is currently unde ned: jg ju 0 ; jg j 2 u 0 ; jg j 3 u 0 ; : : : Thus, for some i, jg j i u 0 = m 0 is de ned before stage 2n but jg jm 0 is not yet de ned; de ne u n = jg jm 0 . We need to show that u n 6 2n,1 m 0 ; i f i t w ere, then u n would already have been de ned to be some jg j i u 0 , and thus jg j ,1 u n w ould already have been de ned, contradicting the assumption. Set U 2n = U 2n,1 , f u n g and 2n to be the transitive closure of 2n,1 fm 0 u n g. W e need to show that it is still true that if some m 2n jg j j u 0 , then for some k j , m = jg j k u 0 ; this is routine. If jg j ,1 u n was already de ned, set U 2n = U 2n,1 and 2n = 2n,1 .
By Lemma 6.4, is a strict partial order on jMj, and U is a dispersed minimal set for . Let jg j and M be constructed as shown. Now let = ! f g. Then is a strict partial order and demonstrates that M satis es the acyclicity constraints.
The di erences between the previous lemma and the next are 1 the new vocabulary may be in nite, and 2 the new model may contain unnameable elements. Lemma 6.6: Let be a rst order sentence involving just the symbols of the program P;P. Let L P be the vocabulary of P, and let L be that vocabulary augmented with constant a and unary function g . Let L 2 be any at most countable vocabulary containing at least L P , and let CEA 2 be based on L 2 . I f : is consistent with P;P; aug; CEA that is, P;P; aug; CEA f : g has a model, then it is consistent with P;P; CEA 2 .
Proof: By the downward L owenheim-Skolem theorem, it su ces to restrict attention to countable models. Let M be a countable model of P;P; aug; CEA f : g with universe jMj. W e shall de ne M 2 to be an interpretation of P;P; CEA 2 with the same universe and the same interpretations for the constants, functions, and predicates of P;P a s M. It follows immediately that M 2 is a model of P;P f : g, regardless of the interpretations of functions and constants if any that do not appear in P. It remains to de ne interpretations of those symbols that appear only in CEA 2 in such a w ay that CEA 2 is satis ed.
We de ne the interpretations of the functions appearing only in CEA 2 , not all at once, but one tuple at a time; that is, we shall build nested sequences of partial functions whose unions are functions as desired. Constants can be treated as 0-ary functions in this construction.
Denote by g j function symbols that appear in CEA 2 but not in P; let jg j j denote their interpretations in M 2 , which w e shall specify. Enumerate in any order all -expressions: expressions" of the form jg j jm 1 ; : : : ; m k , where each m n 2 jMj for 1 n k. Call these -expressions e i , for i 1. Note that j, k, and m 1 ; : : : ; m k depend implicitly on i in this notation, and k may b e 0 .
De ne 0 = P see De nition 6.3, which is a strict partial order on jMj. Let U 0 be the set of elements of jMj that are unnameable in L P . By Lemma 6.3, U 0 is a dispersed minimal set for 0 . F or each expression e i we will pick a distinct element o f U 0 to be its value. This will force all the constants and functions in CEA 2 to be 1-1 and to have disjoint ranges.
We h a ve left to ensure that M 2 satis es the acyclicity constraint of the Clark equality axioms. To d o this, as we build the extension, we build through stages i the relation 2 , as in De nition 6.2, which demonstrates that M 2 satis es the acyclicity constraints. The following invariants are maintained after each stage i of the construction:
1. Values for e 1 ; : : : ; e i have been chosen; 2. P i , and i is a partial order on jMj;
3. U i U 0 , and U i is a dispersed minimal set for i .
They clearly hold for i = 0 .
For i 0, suppose the invariants hold for i , 1 . We need to assign a value to the -expression e i = jg j jm 1 ; : : : ; m k . Doing so will extend the current partial interpretation jg j j to include one more tuple in its domain. Let C = fa; Theorem 6.7: Let be a rst order sentence involving just the symbols of the program P;P. Then is true in the Kunen semantics that is, it is a logical consequence of P;P; CEA if and only if it is a logical consequence of the augmented program, P;P; aug; CEA. The conclusion also holds if CEA and CEA are replaced by a n y CEA 1 and CEA 2 for L 1 and L 2 being any t wo expanding vocabularies of L P .
Proof: The rst part of the theorem follows from the contrapositive forms of the two preceding lemmas, instantiating L 1 and L 2 in turn to L . The second part follows by transforming from L 1 through L to L 2 , using the same lemmas.
Structural Constraints on the Domain
In logic programming, the tradition of assuming the universe is an Herbrand model|usually the Herbrand model of the symbols in program|has become fairly well established. For de nite clause programs this causes no loss of generality: an atom holds in all models of a de nite clause program if and only if it holds in all Herbrand models of the program. But this equivalence breaks down for most semantics of nonde nite programs|and even the de nitions of the semantics must often be generalized to cover non-Herbrand universes.
It is interesting to observe that Theorems 5.3 5.4 of Section 5 use the domain closure axiom dca to ensure the connection between the logical consequences and the existing model-based de nitions in the literature. Now dca at rst seems to be unrelated to the common sense and autoepistemic properties that the wellsup axiom is attempting to enforce, so it is natural to wonder if it is necessary or even desirable. Recall that Kunen's semantics does not require such an axiom, yet it has both a logical and a computational formulation Theorem 4.1, and the logical formulation can be nitely presented Theorem 6.7.
It is not always clear whether permitting or requiring the program to be interpreted in a universe with in nitely many unknown" objects agrees with the user's intentions. This question, called the universal query problem, is discussed by Przymusinska and Przymusinski 33 . In the context of normal software, it seems clear that this is the right idea, and that the domain closure axiom has no place. We w ant procedures" to be as independent as possible of their environments. Certainly, w e do not want their behavior to change when unrelated procedures, containing new symbols, are added to the software system. By assuming the existence of unknown objects, the semantics essentially foresees" the addition of the new, unrelated, symbols.
In this section we i n vestigate the impact of constraints on the domain of interpretation that go beyond CEA, but stop short of domain closure. First, we note that one weakened form of dca that has been proposed has no e ect on augmented programs. Then we formulate a modi ed version of dca that seems to be more natural for logic programs, which w e call the domain foundation axiom, and show that it does have an e ect.
First Order Approximation
Maher has attributed to folk lore" the idea of using a rst order approximation to the domain closure axiom, which w e shall call dca fo . One of the important properties of Kunen's semantics is that its axioms can be expressed in rst order logic, and dca fo stays within this framework. Essentially, dca fo states that every element i s nameable in L P , i.e., it is in the range of the interpretation of some constant or function symbol of P. dca fo def = 8x H h=true x where H is given by De nition 4.2. For the vocabulary of a, g, and f that we h a ve been using, dca fo reduces to: 8x x = a _ 9 y x = gy _ 9 yz x = fy;z and thus says that every element of the universe either is the interpretation of constant symbol a or is in the range of the interpretation of one of the functions f or g. The variant dca fo is de ned analogously over the vocabulary that also includes a and g . The axiom dca logically implies dca fo , but the latter does not imply the former. In particular, dca fo permits models containing in nite descending chains see Section 7.2, such a s : : : z ,1 = gz ,2 ; z 0 = gz ,1 ; z 1 = gz 0 ; z 2 = gz 1 ; : : : that are disjoint from the Herbrand universe. However, dca disallows such a model. Theorem 7.1: Let be a rst order sentence involving just the symbols of the program P;P. Then is a logical consequence of the augmented program, P;P; aug; CEA, if and only if it is a logical consequence of P;P; aug; CEA; dca fo .
Proof: The if" direction is trivial, and the only if" direction is a corollary of Lemma 6.5.
Another variant i s P;P; aug; CEA; dca. This can be shown to have di erent consequences, for appropriate P's, both from P;P; CEA; dca, which is Fitting's semantics see Example 4.1, and from P;P; aug; CEA, which w as shown to be the same as Kunen's semantics. In the latter case, the import of dca is that it prevents in nite descending chains. This issue is discussed further in Section 7.2.
In nite Descending Chains
On many augmented programs perhaps most realistic ones, dca does not a ect the logical consequences. That is, P;P; aug; CEA; wellsup has the same logical consequences with and without dca. The next example shows that this is not true in all cases. The fundamental issue is whether a model can have in nite descending chains", as de ned below. Without dca such c hains are possible.
De nition 7.1: Let jMj be a structure for the vocabulary L, which contains unary function g and binary function f. Let their interpretations be jgj and jfj. A n in nite descending chain is a sequence z 0 ; z 1 ; z 2 ; : : : of elements of jMj such that, for all natural numbers k: either z k = jfjz k+1 ; x for some x 2 jMj, o r z k = jfjx; z k+1 for some x 2 jMj, o r z k = jgjz k+1 . In a general vocabulary, the disjunction covers all functions and z k+1 appears in all of their argument positions. This de nition also includes the case where there are an in nite number of function symbols, although that case cannot be stated by a nite-length formula in formal logic. Note that the z k need not be distinct. Intuitively, px i s i n tended to mean that there is no in nite descending s-chain from x, while qx means the opposite. The q rule may be read, Term sy has an in nitely descending s-chain if y does not lack one." Note that eliminating q would introduce a universal quanti er in the rule for p. The dualized version, P;P, is: px x = a _qx qx 9y x = sy & py n 9x q x px x 6 = a & qx qx 8y x 6 = sy _ py ñ 8xqx
From P;P; aug; CEA; wellsupP;P; dca one can infer px andqx for each x of the form s k y, where y is not in the range of s and k 0 is a natural number. But, according to dca, all elements in the range of s are of that form; hence one can concludeñ.
On the other hand, without dca the rest of the axioms have models in which n is false. For example, let the domain consist of the Herbrand universe of the augmented program, together with Z, the integers positive and negative. In Z, w e i n terpret s as the usual integer successor, while in the Herbrand universe we interpret s as itself". Finally, w e i n terpret p andq to be true only in the Herbrand universe, and interpret p and q to be true in Z. N o w n may be false.
Looking closely, w e see that the axiom wellsup has no e ect on this program, because none of the original, normal rules has a positive recursive subgoal. This phenomenon has been observed before 43 , and can be seen by observing that the unsup axiom simpli es to U ~ q=S , as~ has no tilde atoms. But theñ q=S = S at any xpoint, and wellsup is trivially satis ed. Thus this example makes the same point for semantics not based on wellsup: E v en applying domain closure axioms to an augmented vocabulary, which contains additional functions not in P, can change the truth of sentences containing only symbols of P.
Domain Foundation Axiom
Having seen that dca, the domain closure axiom, a ects the logical consequences of augmented programs, even with wellsup present, it is natural to ask whether it is a bug" or a feature". Rules might b e i n terpreted in nonmonotonic logic in many contexts, so there is probably not one correct answer. In the context of logic programs, uninterpreted function symbols play the role of record constructors, and their names can often be thought of as data types. Conceptually, data structures must be constructed by computation; they have no independent existence as do the integers. Therefore it seems reasonable to require that any data structure of a known type must be well-founded, that is, must not have a n y in nitely descending chains.
However, it does not seem necessary or reasonable to require that the constructor can only be applied to objects currently in the program, for then the data type changes when the program changes. Reasoning about data types becomes di cult and of transient v alue at best in this case.
With these observations as motivation, we propose a new axiom, which w e call the domain foundation axiom dfa whose e ect is to prevent in nite descending chains, while permitting the universe to contain unnameable elements. Recall that the inductive closure of the rule wx w x is expressed by the second order formula 8x wx $ w x & 8R w w=R R ! w R that z 1 6 2 U. Continue this way inductively, de ning z n+1 from z n as z 1 was de ned from z 0 . This produces an in nite descending chain.
The domain foundation axiom subsumes the acyclicity constraint of CEA, as shown next. The converse is not true, as was shown by Example 7.1. Theorem 7.3: A structure that satis es dfa must also satisfy the acyclicity constraint of CEA. Proof: If x = t is true, where t is a term containing x, then an in nite descending chain can be built by repeatedly traversing the term t viewed as a tree from its root to the place where x occurs. Lemma 7.4: Suppose a structure M for functional vocabulary L satis es CEA. Then M satis es dca if and only if it satis es dfa and dca fo .
Proof: First suppose it satis es dca. Then it must be an isomorphic copy of the Herbrand universe, and by construction the Herbrand universe satis es dca fo and has no descending chains. By Lemma 7.2 it satis es dfa. Conversely, suppose M satis es dfa and dca fo . Since M satis es CEA, an isomorphic copy H of the Herbrand universe is a subset of jMj; the goal is to show that H is all of jMj. Suppose x 0 2 jMj , H. Then x 0 cannot be the interpretation of a constant that would be in H, so, by dca fo , x 0 = fy;z for some function symbol f and for some y;z. If both y;z 2 H , then x 0 2 H , so either y 6 2 H or z 6 2 H. Set x 1 to be either y or z so that x 1 6 2 H. N o w repeat the construction to get x 2 ; x 3 ; : : : . This is an in nite descending chain, contradicting Lemma 7.2.
Analogous to Theorem 7.1 is the following Theorem 7.5, which clari es to what extent the domain closure assumption a ects the semantics discussed in this paper, in the presence of aug and CEA. The proof uses the same ideas as the proof of Lemma 6.5. Theorem 7.5: Let be a rst order sentence involving just the symbols of the program P;P. Then is true in all models of P;P; aug; CEA; wellsupq;q; dfa if and only if is true in all models of P;P; aug; CEA; wellsupq;q; dca. Also, is true in all models of P;P; aug; CEA; dfa if and only if is true in all models of P;P; aug; CEA; dca.
Proof: The proofs of the two statements are essentially identical; we prove the rst. The if" direction is now immediate by Lemma 7.4. For the only if" direction, we shall prove the contrapositive form: If P;P; aug; CEA; wellsupq;q; dfa f : g has any model, then so does P;P; aug; CEA; wellsupq;q; dca f : g Suppose P;P; aug; CEA; wellsupq;q; dfa f : g has a model N. Then by Theorem 5.5, P;P; aug; CEA; wellsupq;q f : g has a countable elementary submodel M, with universe jMj.
Moreover, M is a model of dfa, since any in nite descending chain in M would also be an in nite descending chain in N, contradicting dfa i n N.
By CEA, in nitely many elements of jMj are in the ranges of the interpretations of a and g , and hence unnameable in L P . We shall discard the old interpretations of these augmentation symbols and construct new interpretations, ja j and jg j, that cover" all unnameable in L P elements. Doing so causes dca fo to be satis ed, that is, it makes all elements of jMj become nameable in L . In the new model, all other symbols will be interpreted as in M; it will be necessary only to make sure that CEA; dfa; dca fo is satis ed.
Since jMj contains no in nite descending chains, for each m in M there are only nitely many m 0 in M where m 0 P m by K onig's Theorem on nitely branching trees. Hence an enumeration m 1 ; m 2 ; : : : of jMj can be chosen so that if m i P m j see De nition 6.3, then i j . That is, P respects subscript order.
As in Lemma 6.5, let u 0 ; u 1 ; u 2 ; : : :be the subsequence of m 1 ; m 2 ; : : :consisting of elements that are unnameable in L P . Thus u i = m j for some j i. Now simply de ne ja j = u 0 and jg jm n = u n for n 1. Beginning with the partial order = P , and adding the relationships m n u n maintains the property that respects subscript order. It follows easily that the transitive closure of is a partial order, and has no in nitely descending chains, so dfa is satis ed. By construction, the global injectivity part of CEA is satis ed and all of jMj is nameable in L , s o dca fo is satis ed. By Lemma 7.4, dca is satis ed.
Conclusion
We h a ve addressed two primary issues is this paper. First, using the tool of the dualized program, we h a ve provided what we feel is a more natural axiomatization of the well-founded and stable semantics. In addition, we h a ve presented nite albeit sometimes second-order axiomatizations for several other semantics.
Second, as we noted, the restriction to Herbrand universes in logic programming is becoming suspect. We h a ve examined various weakenings of that restriction, dca, dfa, and dca fo . W e h a ve compared the formulations of program-completion, stable, and well-founded semantics under di ering domain axioms. The relationships are illustrated in Figure 1 . Again, we h a ve also provided nite albeit sometimes second-order axiomatizations of domain assumptions. In particular, dfa, proposed here, seems to merit consideration as the proper domain assumption for logic programming.
Future Work
The natural and open questions concern variations of well-founded and stable semantics that are less closely tied to the Herbrand universe:
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